From JSO:
quote:
What is the 'pistol' formation
To understand the lessons the Ravens learned, you have to first understand the "pistol" formation and the read-option scheme.
The "pistol" is a variation of the shotgun formation where the quarterback stands 4 yards behind the line of scrimmage instead of 5 or 6 and usually has a running back and a tight end to either side of him. The read-option part comes after the snap when the quarterback decides based on the way the defense plays whether to give the ball to his running back or fake it to him and either run or drop back to pass.
It's a fairly simple concept, one that college teams have used for decades, and the main reason it hadn't been used in the NFL is the reluctance of coaches to expose their quarterbacks to the hits normally reserved for running backs. Only the recent influx of well-built, elusive and strong-armed quarterbacks like Kaepernick, Cam Newton, Robert Griffin III and Russell Wilson has made it possible to explore option possibilities.
What many people don't understand is that the primary objective in the scheme is not to have the quarterback carry the ball, but to open up lanes between the tackles for talented running backs like the 49ers' Frank Gore to exploit. Only the extreme talents of guys like Kaepernick and Griffin have made the quarterback run such a dangerous threat.
"Colin is one of the rarest athletes I have been around and I have been around a lot of them," 49ers offensive coordinator Greg Roman said of the 6-foot-4Â―, 230-pound Kaepernick. "A guy that can throw it with such accuracy, run and have the mind he has - it is a dangerous weapon."
Against the Packers, Kaepernick accounted for 444 total yards, but even more incredible was the number of big plays he made to get to that number. He had runs of 56, 20, 19 and 18 yards and pass completions of 45, 44, 20, 18 and 17.
Defending read-option plays
The 49ers had two weeks to prepare for the Packers and heading into the playoffs they had limited their use of "pistol" and read-option plays in hopes of springing it on an unsuspecting opponent. To defend the read-option, you have to know your assignment, be disciplined enough not to be drawn away from it and athletic enough to make the play when it does come your way.
And you really need to practice against it.
"A common mistake is guys doing their own thing," Ravens defensive coordinator Dean Pees said. "It may be an outside guy and they're running the option and he's running up the field because he thinks it's pass rush A lot of things like that. There have been some teams that have done very, very well against it and they've been very disciplined on it.
"The Miami Dolphins played the heck out of San Francisco and one play had a breakdown and Kaepernick went for 40 on them. That's all it takes."
According to Pees, Packers defensive coordinator Dom Capers adjusted well to the scheme once it was clear the 49ers were going to run it, but too many things broke down either because of missed assignments or inferior athletic ability.
Two cases in point: Capers blitzed Kaepernick from the slot and had him dead to rights, but cornerback Casey Hayward couldn't get Kaepernick down; Capers "spied" Kaepernick on one play and with linebacker Erik Walden there to sweep him up as he scrambled up the middle, the 49ers quarterback juked him badly and ran up the middle for a first down.
"First of all, you have to have a spy that can run with him," Pees said of using that option. "You can say Dom made a good call. It was a good call. They collapsed the pocket but the spy couldn't catch him. He started to go one way, the linebacker goes that way and he takes off the other way and the linebacker is 2 yards behind him. Done. Over with."
First and foremost, the Ravens have to address the read-option.
Packers linebackers Clay Matthews and Walden, in particular, were too aggressive and instead of making sure that Kaepernick had handed the ball off went after Gore on the dive play. That can work, but the inside linebacker to that side has to "scrape" or flow outside, so that there's a defender to keep Kaepernick from running around the corner.
Atlanta held its defensive ends in place and told them to take away Kaepernick's run option. As a result, he carried the ball only twice, 14 times fewer than against the Packers. But Atlanta could not stop Gore (21 carries, 90 yards, two touchdowns) from running up the middle because the 49ers didn't have to devote blockers to the ends and could use them to double-team the defensive linemen.
It also slowed down the pass rush so that Kaepernick could stand in the pocket after a fake handoff and wait for his receivers to run deep. Despite a slow start he completed 16 of 21 passes for 233 yards and a touchdown.
"I think the most common mistake is probably when they'll put the defensive end usually on the quarterback and when he comes up field full speed it creates a big lane for the dive play, for Gore to come through," Ravens linebacker Paul Kruger said. "You can't create a lot of space on the dive because if they gash you on that a couple times then everybody gets sucked in and the quarterback has a chance to get out."
Ravens learned from Packer Mistakes
Now Im not holding Capers harmless. Im sure in a re-do, he'd do some things differently. But the more I read pieces like this, the more I see Capers knew what was needed. He just didn't have the right guys OR they plain and simple didn't make the play and there wasn't enough time to practice against it.
